Developing an Army Safety Awareness Program - Aviation (SAPA)

Aviation Directorate
United States Army Combat
Readiness/Safety Center
Data Current as of 01 MAR 12

Safety Awareness Program Aviation (SAP-A)

SAP-A is a program designed to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of accidents and incidents

- anonymous, self-reporting system modeled after systems currently in place at many airlines under auspices of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- encourages voluntary reporting of operations and maintenance safety high risk practices
- designed to provide a non-punitive environment for the open reporting of safety concerns and

End state of SAP-A Implementation

To prevent mishaps by addressing unintentional errors, hazardous situations and events, or high-risk activities not identified and/or correctable by other methods or through traditional safety reporting sources

- The reported information is used to reduce mishaps through operational, maintenance, training and procedural enhancements
- Due to its capability of providing *early identification* of needed safety improvements, SAP-A offers significant potential for avoiding mishaps

Where's the Risk?

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT

Enemy Based

Hazard

IED

Small Arms/RPG MANPADS **Risk Management**

Restraints

Speed

Roadways

Successful Risk Management

Risk Management

What's going to kill me & my buddies, The enemy or a hazard?

AUU08

SAP-A ASSISTS IN EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF RISK -

- Textual reporting of errors, high-risk activity, or observed hazardous situations
- Non-punitive resolution of safety, training, and opsissues at the unit level
- Facilitates commander's risk management process
- Includes analysis, trending & corrective action capability at the Army/joint level
- Tailored report format for various users
- Augments, but does not replace, existing safety reporting systems
- In use by Air Force (Air Mobility Command), Navy and the commercial airline industry – titled Aviation Safety Action/ Awareness Program (ASAP)

Aviation Trends

- **Overconfidence/Complacency**
 - 88% involved overconf

HUMAN

n Planning

pian for obstacles eanagement issues

- **Aircrew**
 - 22% involved

40

30

20

10


TO LOW Risk Missions

ERROR OCCUTTED during the day

→⁄% happened during training

(year to date)

Manned Aircraft Accidents



As of 27 February 2012

Why Army Aviation Needs

- Has the potential to reduce the large % (> 80%) of accidents caused by Human Error
- DSOC pays for Beta and Operational tests and development for the Army
 - The joint community is working ASAP/SAP-A as a parallel action
- Logical step into the digital age of reporting hazards to Army Aviation
- Current HAZLOG methods are antiquated; SAP-A is a proactive approach
- Greatly improves the ability to capture and quickly share Army level trend information

Programs in Use

- Navy requires 100% post-flight ASAP/SAP-A reporting
- Air Force: in use by AMC
 - AMC/CV-directed assessment Aug 07
 - AMC/A3 and staff visited Continental Airlines in '08 and '09
 - AMC program demo Jun 09, now throughout AMC
- In use by most commercial airlines
- In use by NASA
- Army has no program for operational units

What SAP-A Can Capture

- SAFETY OF FLIGHT RELATED EVENTS NOT NORMALLY REPORTED OR CAPTURED BY OTHER METHODS
- Unintentional errors by individuals, crewmembers or other personnel involved with a mission
- Errors committed by other individuals or organizations that adversely affected or could have affected the safety of the mission (includes maintenance, operations, POL; not just aircrew reports)
- Any unsafe action, event or condition encountered, from mission planning through execution
- Observed hazards that may not have directly affected your operation, but may affect another
- Any other events considered worthy of reporting to ensure safe practices and flying safely

How SAP-A Works for CAB

HAZA

 Individuals report hazards (either anonymously or with POC info) that they feel need to be addressed via internet connection or written report through flight operations

 An option is provided for an individual to report "immediate attention required" hazards to both the Safety Officer and CDR

 Hazard info is captured by the program and summarized The system
is primarily
closed
looped at
the
company or
battalion
level;
Commander
s may
provide
feedback to
those

reporting, if so desired

Command Program

Captured data allows TREND
ANALYSIS

1

2

3

How SAP-A Works for



 Individuals report hazards (either anonymously or with POC info) that they feel need to be addressed via internet connection or written report through flight operations

 BRZ works to gather and maintain all hazard reports for the Army and provide trend analysis Februay 2012
Flightfax
Flighine Report of Army Alrer art Mishaps

This edition is the last in a series of four focused on the human errors behind a majority of Army Aviation accidents. Through these four editions, we've explained strategies to combat overconfidence/complacency, inadequer inside mission planning, aircraw confinition errors and sequential or following the missions.

As we finish fiscal year 2011 and thus far in 2012, we are seeing a disturbing trend it raining and executing aviation combat missions. Date shows a breekdown of communication in step two of the three-step flight mission approval process, specifically in mission planning and briefing. Publications and messages from the U.S. Combat Readiness and Safety Center may seem to get repetitive in covering this topic. It is also repetitive for u to review accidents where human error is evident. There's certainly room for improvement in the mission briefing process, as evidenced by everything from conducting ad hor "VOCC" briefs when there could have been time to conduct a face-to-face or over-the-shoulder brief to mission briefing officers. This critical step involves detailed planning and thorough risk assessment from each crewmember and briefing interaction in ensuring selection and personal interaction in ensuring yelements are evaluated, briefed and understood by everyone involved in the mission.

involved in the mission. In an effort of develop another tool for commanders to diagnose and mitigate hazards, especially human error hazards, we began an operational field test only reformed that the 3P combat Aviation Brigade that will yeld information to reform a visition leaders combat the human-error problem. Perhaps our most important venture is the study on the Safety Americas Program — Aviation. The SAPA is a proactive hazard reporting program designated to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of the protting program designated to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of the protting program designated to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of the action currently in place at proxy after a uniform surgice of the Federal derivation and the safety of the safety and the safety and the safety and the safety is sues and events. SAPA is designed to provide a non-punitive environment for the open reporting of safety concern sand information that might be critical to identifying precursors to accidents. The submitter may either observice or experience a safety concern. The goal of SAPA is to prevent and predict inishaps by addressing those unintentional errors, hazardous situations/events, and high-risk activities not identifies or correctable through traditional safety reporting sources. The test will continue through the third quarter of this year, with follow-or development after a thorough review of the test results.

this year, with follow-on development after a morough review of the test results. We've addressed the "low-hanging fruit" risks. With diligence and teamwork, we significantly reduce risk induced by human error. Until next month, fity safe!

LTC Christopher Prather USACR/SC Aviation Director email: christopher.prather@us.armv.mil

 Army wide trend information to the CRC (Aviation Directorate)

At the Army level, USACRC shares Army Aviation wide trend information across aviation brigades
At the joint level, services will share hazard information in order to avoid replicating mistakes made

2

3

Time Line for SAP-**SAP-A PROGR**

UL 12 - SEP 12

Analysis of operationa results;

changes to Army SAP-A long term funding

15 FEB - 28 JUN 12 Operational Test

06-14 FEB 12 Conduct unit train-up

NOV 11 Initial unit

NOV 11 Unit Selection for SAP-A participation (3CAB &

OCT 11-JUN I2 Development of Smart

Phone App

OCT 11 Staffing actions to identify designated unit(s) for operational tes plus

individual ARNG, USAR, FW, ATC 25 JUL – 31 AUG 11: Small scale beta test conducted at FT Rucker, AL

FY 2012 DoDI

"Proactive Safety

Programs such as MFOQA and SAP-A"

SEP 11 DSOC

Statement of work for

Operational

Completed

Test

Requirements: Operational

• 3rd CAB Identified to participate in a six month operational test

Who: 3rd CAB, Hunter AAF, GA. Additional participants include HAAF Operations and USCG Savannah

What: Conduct SAP-A reporting ICW post mission debriefs. Goal would be mandatory participation as part of the risk management process

When: Test commences 2nd and 3rd Quarter FY12

Where: Unit location: Hunter AAF, GA

How: Reports are made through a BRZ web site or as a written entry; development of a smart phone app will be researched

Why: To supplement safety/hazard reporting procedures and to test the program for large scale use

Specific Unit Requirements

- Unit area: Internet access to SAP-A website
- Input from aircrew following each mission to include NSTR
- Personnel provide feedback on SAP-A procedures to develop and improve the system
- Testing/reporting lasts for a six month period
- ASOs/Cdrs monitor results and provide feedback

CRC Requirements

- Army POC (Aviation Directorate USACR/SC) for SAP-A testing and implementation
- Coordinate for statement of work for contracting SAP-A Operational Test. Sole source contracting awarded to BRZ to run the Operational Test
- Coordinate for unit training for conduct of the test
- Funding for Operational Test approved through DSOC for FY 12. Should include hiring of one civilian contactor at the USACR/SC to implement and monitor SAP-A actions
- Gauge success of testing and provide recommendations for implementation and long term funding

Long Term Requirements

- Acceptance: Navy's ASAP/SAP-A is mandated; Air Force is voluntary; recommended Army course of action is to make it a mandatory part of the debriefing process through unit flight operations (unit Aviation Safety Officer remains the focal point)
- Funding: DSOC initiatives are funding beta tests through SEP 2012. Long term funding must be established in order to continue with the program beyond 2012. Current thought process is for the USACR/SC to budget for the Army

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
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SAP-A Input Procedures



12.5%

Help

Next

Narrative

Please Enter Comments To Help Clarify And Categorize The Main Event That Occurred







Comments / Lessons Learned / What Could Be Improved (Maximum 2000 characters)

Ground ATC cleared two aircraft out of hot refuel without giving advisories of the movement to each aircraft

Characters Remaining:

1892

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Help

Event Category

Please Categorize The Main Event / Reason For This Report By Clicking On The Appropriate Selection, e.g. (Airframe, Birds, Hypoxia, etc.)


Airfield	Animal∕√ehicle Activity	Irregular Ops	Lights/Signs/Paint	NAV Aid	Pad	Runway	Taxiway
Airspace	Altitude Deviation	Birds	Near Mid Air	Operating Area	Route Deviation	UAS Conflict	
Communication	Controlling Agency	Equipment Problem	Lost Comm	Pilot/Crew/Mx	Tactical Comm		
Compliance	Aircraft Limitations	Controlling Agency	Indiscipline	ROE	SOP		
Maintenance	Acft Not Ready	Aircrew Delay	Fueling Issue	Mx Pers/Equip/Parts	Mx/Aircrew Conflict	Repeat Gripe	System Failure
Mission Snafus	Briefing	Computer Availability	Debriefing	Execution	Parts Availability	Planning	Scheduling
Physiology	Distraction	Fatigue	Нурохіа	Illness	Illusion	Temperature Extreme	Vertigo
Return To Base	Approach	Emergency Landing	Go Around	GPWS/Terrain	Landing	Pattern	
Runway Events	Abnormal Landing	Aborted T/O	Blown Tire	Incursion			
Unsafe Practices	Aircraft	Controlling Agency	Ground Equipment	Personnel			
Weather	Forecast Accuracy	Graphics Usefulness	High/Limit Winds	lcing	Severe Weather	Visibility/Ceiling	Weather Brief Delivery

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37.5%

Help



Event Location

Please Select Where The Main Event Occurred, e.g. What Phase Of Operation Was Associated With The Main Event. Enter Four Letter ICAO Identifier If Applicable To The Event (Please Enter NONE if ICAO was NOT pertinent to the event).


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Command Overview

Please Enter Your Assessment Of Overall Company Command Climate Indicators






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
Help



Complete

Please Click The 'Submit' or the 'Finish' Button To Enter Information Into The Database













Enter SAP-A | Report | SAP-A News | Quarterly Rpt | User Manual | Logout |

SAP-A Entry Form - Success

You have successfully added an ASAP Report to the system. Thank you for your input!

To enter another report, do one of the following:

- Click on the graphic in the upper left corner of the screen.
- · Select the menu item Enter Pulse+ on the menu bar.
- <u>NOTICE</u>: For Security Purposes, The System Will Now Automatically Logout In 30 Seconds Unless You Click Button Below

System Record Number: 4 - (Use this number if you ever need to refer to this report)

Time Remaining To Automatic Logout

14.6

Cancel Auto Logout


Example SAP-A Report

Report Comments 01 JAN 10 - 31 JAN 10

04 Jan 2010	69619	Aviator	E-2C	NO EVENT OCCURRED	No Event Occurred
Nothing to report.					*
05 Jan 2010	70132	Aviator	E-2C	Airspace	Near Mid Air
departure end of a	runway 29 at 600 fee	et. Crew of E-2 had sed approach was	to take evasive m initiated and traffic	2 was transiting the airfield from the annuevering, aggressive climbing called by PAR final controller. To the feet on climbout toward Point.	left, turn to avoid the traffic. E-2 ower was not simulcasting on
06 Jan 2010	70688	Aircrewman	C-2A	NO EVENT OCCURRED	No Event Occurred
everything went w	vell How about one	of those buttons at	the top? Flight we	nt as briefed, no problems at all	check!
06 Jan 2010	70703	Aviator	E-2C	Maintenance	Airframe
Smoke and fumes plane was safely	s in the FEC caused landed back at home	us to abort our mis e field with the seve	sion and RTB. Har erity of the emerger	ndled emergency in accordance v ncy not necessitating an emerger	with NATOPs procedures the acy divert.
06 Jan 2010	70728	Aviator	E-2C	Airspace	Birds
runway 21) san xwn slightly left of acticed the flock of collowing the glide	edicted flight path). One of the control of the con	CAPC directed copi as big enough to pa ne same location, the sewinds. Altitude was a climbe and adde the visual scan had	lot to not descend as down both sides hough closer to the ras roughly the san d power to avoid or not picked up thes	PC (Non-flying pilot) visually ahe any further, and added power. B s of the aircraft. Similar flock exp extended centerline of the runw ne (between 450-425 feet AGL). ollision with numerous seagulls. e birds in either case, a collision	irds passed directly below the erienced on the next pass (PAR ay. The approach was being CAPC (Non-flying pilot) again Landing conducted normally would have occured and due to
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
Subjects

Subjects



SAPA LITE LISARMY

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




Newsletter

Draft

N-Plane Sight



N-Plane Sight is a monthly newsletter from CNAF N45 presenting ASAP information identified as significant and safety related articles and sound bites

Answering the ASAP hate mail:

When ASAP started, the Air Boss said he wanted an ASAP report after every flight to infuse the program into the culture of Naval Aviation. He knew it would be one more thing on your already full plate, but he believed the value of the program warranted the extra effort. By design, ASAP is a living program, one that has changed and will continue to change as participation warrants. Many of you think the information is going into a black hole; you're wrong. Every ASAP input is reviewed and

mined for actionable information; even the ones asking us to perform some anatomically impossible act with our heads. The people analyzing the data have been in the business of working with high risk operations for more than 30 years. They're use to taking the hits from highly skilled professionals who think programs like ASAP are a waste of their valuable time. That was exactly the reaction of emergency room Doctors when asked to participate in a program similar to ASAP. But after they realized that business as usual was not going to reduce the 15,000

foreign objects left in patients after surgery; the 50,000 cases of "wrong site" operations; and the 200 people who die from medical malpractice each year, they got onboard. Once they decided to give the program a try, the results made them ardent supporters; why? - because it works. In the end, the decision to participate constructively in the Navy ASAP program is yours. If you give it an honest shot, it can help save lives and airframes.

Pilot Error: Increasing or Decreasing?

2011

A study conducted by John Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health on a case-series analysis of crashes and other mishaps of domestic air carrier flights (n = 558) that occurred during 1983 through 2002 concluded that the overall mishap rate remained fairly stable, but the proportion of mishaps involving pilot error decreased from 42% in 1983-1987 to 25% in 1998-2002. The rate of mishaps related to poor decisions declined from 6.2 to 1.8 per 10 million flights, a 71% reduction; much of this decrease was attributed to a 76% reduction in poor decisions related to weather.

SAP-A DEMO

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